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Introduction

I

n the history of the development of the law of armed conflict, the year
1987 stood out in more than one respect. It was the 10th anniversary of
the adoption, on 8 June 1977, of two Protocols Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, one (Protocol I) relating to the protection
of victims of international armed conflicts and the other (Protocol II) relating
to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts.1 The
Netherlands ratified both Protocols, thus joining the growing number of states
parties to these instruments.2 President Reagan announced his decision to
submit only Protocol II for Senatorial advice and consent.3 Last but not least,
all u.S. naval commanders received as Naval Warfare Publication 9, 1987,
a brand-new CommanderJs Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations.
Among the many recent publications about the state of and developments
in the law of armed conflict, the Handbook is of special interest because, as
an official u.S. publication following so shortly the President's
announcement, it may be expected to reflect the views of the present u.S.
administration on the state of the law. This is not merely a matter of academic
interest; the law of armed conflict relies for its continued existence and further
development as much on custom as on the conclusion of treaties, and the part
of the Handbook relating to the law of armed conflict may be taken to represent
United States op in io juris in this regard.
As we shall see, the "views of the present u.S. administration" are a
mixture of rules in treaties to which the United States is a party, rules of
international customary law, and those new rules in Protocol I which the
present U.S. administration has chosen to consider as positive developments.
Obviously, the United States is not legally bound to apply any rule of the
last-mentioned category. Conversely, its unilateral espousal of such new rules
cannot effectuate a legal obligation upon its potential adversaries, whether
The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.
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parties to Protocol I or otherwise, to respect these rules in their relations
with the United States.
The focus in the present comment is on Chapter 11 of the Handbook, with
its deceptively simple title "Noncombatant Persons." Like the rest of the
Handbook, Chapter 11 earns high marks for brevity; it is, in effect, a great
deal shorter than the relevant provisions of treaties in force taken together.
This exercise in abbreviation carried a double risk: for one thing, the drafters
may have left out subject matter that might be regarded as of vital importance
to U.S. naval commanders; for another thing, the necessary condensation of
often complex treaty language into simpler, ostensibly clearer phrases may
at times have resulted in what an outsider might consider an inadmissible loss
of legal precision. The question needs to be examined as to what extent the
drafters have succeeded in avoiding these risks.
Section II of this essay takes a first look at the term "noncombatant persons"
as used in the Handbook; it introduces the applicable treaties and goes into
the question of what appears to be the scope of application of Chapter 11.
In sections III and IV, the various categories of "noncombatant persons" pass
in review, in the same order as they appear in the Handbook: the civilian
population in general in section III; other categories of persons in section IV.
Focal points are: conditions for recognition and protection as a
"noncombatant person," factors entailing loss of protection, and the
treatment of the persons in question. Also in section IV, some attention is
devoted to protective signs and symbols, the use of distinctive signals and
means and methods of identification in general. A brief concluding section
rounds off these comments.

II. "Noncombatant Persons"4
The Term HNoncombatant"
Although the term used in the title of Chapter 11 of the Handbook may
appear simple enough, surely a "noncombatant" does not represent a simple
notion at all. The term is used to indicate a broad range of people with very
different characteristics. This is apparent from the introductory paragraph
11.1 of the chapter, which states in part:
Noncombatants are those individuals who do not form a part of the armed forces and
who otherwise refrain from the commission of hostile acts. Noncombatants also include
those members of the armed forces who enjoy special protected status, such as medical
personnel and chaplains, or who have been rendered incapable of combat by wounds,
sickness, shipwreck, or capture.

When a lawyer is told that something "is" this but "also includes"
something else, alarm-bells start ringing in his mind: are the notions thus
brought together under one heading really similar in all relevant respects?
His alertness grows when he notices that an earlier chapter of the Handbook
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(Chapter 5, to which paragraph 11.1 refers) uses much more cautious
language. Paragraph 5.3, on Combatants and Noncombatants, begins by
stating, in much the same words as those used in paragraph 11.1, that: "The
term noncombatant is primarily applied to those individuals who do not form
a part of the armed forces and who otherwise refrain from the commission
or direct support of hostile acts." It then explains that, "[i]n this context,
noncombatants and, generally, the civilian population are synonymous."
Paragraph 11.3 adds that, "[t]he civilian population consists of all persons not
serving in the armed forces, militia, or paramilitary forces and not otherwise
taking a direct part in the hostilities."
After this elucidation of what is offered as the primary meaning of the
term, paragraph 5.3 informs the reader that "noncombatants" ~ay also have
entirely different connotations:
The term noncombatants may, however, also embrace certain categories of persons who,
although attached to or accompanying the armed forces, enjoy special protected status,
such as medical officers, corpsmen, chaplains, and war correspondents. The term is also
applied to armed forces personnel who are unable to engage in combat because of
wounds, sickness, shipwreck, or capture.

Treaties Relating to "Noncombatant Persons"
Without entering for the moment into the details of the various statements
in paragraphs 5.3, 11.1 and 11.3, it appears useful to identify at the outset
the treaties especially relevant to the present inquiry. It is surely a trite
observation that, unfortunately, the law of armed conflict does not provide
just one set of rules governing the position of all "noncombatants" as "people
not involved in the fighting," in the sense as used in the Handbook. Indeed,
with one exception, the treaties in force do not use the term at all.s
The majority of the treaties concerned belong to what is commonly known
as the "law of Geneva," that is, the long list of conventions starting, modestly
enough, with the ten articles of the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration
of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field, of22 August 1864,6
which over the course of time came to provide for the protection of an everwidening circle of war victims. The Convention on the wounded and sick
soldiers in the field of 1864 was followed by the wounded, sick and
shipwrecked at sea in 1899;7 prisoners of war in 1929;8 and last but not least,
civilians, mainly though not exclusively those in enemy or enemy-occupied
territory, in 1949.9
While the "law of Geneva" knew this regular, step-by-step development,
another part of the law of armed conflict, governing conduct during hostilities
and commonly referred to as the "law of The Hague," was codified in a rather
distant past, by the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907.10 After this
feat the "law of The Hague" was for a long while left alone (and to customary
development). Major parts of this body of Hague law eventually came to be
included in the" reaffirmation and development of international humanitarian
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law applicable in armed conflicts" of the 1970s that resulted in the adoption,
in 1977, of the two Additional Protocols referred to above.
For purposes of the present comment the following treaties are of particular
significance:
- the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the protection of war victims,
viz., the First Convention (wounded and sick on land); the Second Convention
(wounded, sick and shipwrecked at sea); the Third Convention (prisoners of
war); and the Fourth Convention (civilians);
- the Hague Regulations on land warfare, of 1899/1907, together with the
Hague Convention (IX) on naval bombardment; and
- the Additional Protocols of 1977.
Examination of the relations between the various types of "noncombatant
persons" listed in the Handbook and the categories of persons specified in the
relevant treaties will be the main purpose of the next sections.
Scope of Application of Chapter 11
A preliminary point is the scope of application of Chapter 11 (and
presumably, of the entire Part II of the Handbook, on the "Law of Naval
Warfare "), both as regards time and place.
Part II of the Handbook refers throughout to "armed conflict," without any
attempt at definition. In the law of armed conflict, the term encompasses
both international and internal armed conflicts. Since 1949, Art. 3, common
to the four Geneva Conventions, makes separate provision for the latter type
of armed conflict. In 1977, Art. 3 was supplemented by Protocol II. While
the conduct of hostilities in an internal armed conflict need not be very
different from the same sort of activities in an international one, the law
differs significantly. One such difference is that the law relating to internal
armed conflicts, whether in its 1949 or 1977 versions, does not recognize a
separate category of" combatants," as those persons who, in contradistinction
to the rest of the population, "have the right to participate directly in
hostilities. "11
Chapter 11 and Part II in general do not differentiate between the two
types of armed conflict and appear to have been written with an eye to
international armed conflicts in particular. Yet, the u.S. Navy may become
involved in an internal armed conflict in two different situations: when the
United States itself becomes the scene of such a conflict, or when it steps
into an internal conflict elsewhere. The first case is probably so purely
hypothetical that provision need not be made for it in a Commander's Handbook
on the Law of Naval Operations. On the other hand, in United States practice,
active involvement in other nations' conflicts is not a rare occurrence at all.
Outside intervention in an internal armed conflict habitually gives rise to
interesting legal questions: when does this or the other part of the law of
armed conflict apply, and to whom? Does it matter whether the intervention
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is on the side of the incumbent authorities or on the other side? Refreshingly,
the Handbook leaves all these more or less pedantic questions for what they
are and confines itself to one maximum solution: when the u.s. Navy is
involved in a shooting war, it shall apply the rules governing international
armed conflict. One can only be gratified with such an outright choice for
the rules providing greatest protection to "noncombatant persons" and other
war victims. 12
Another matter is the territorial scope of application. Part II being
concerned with "Naval Warfare," one might think of the sea as the natural
theatre of naval operations. Yet, a perusal of the text leaves little doubt that
it is designed to be applied on a far broader basis and, in effect, on land and
in the air as much as at sea. A case in point is Chapter 11, which gives a
good deal of attention to the protection of the civilian population against the
effects of hostilities, as well as to the situation of persons parachuting from
disabled aircraft and who mayor may not land in territory controlled by
their own forces. Conversely, the whole of Part II pays surprisingly little
attention to hospital ships.
One may perceive in this wide scope of application of Part II, and of
Chapter 11 in particular, a recognition that "naval operations" include those
of the naval air arm, amphibious forces and the marines, and that these do
quite often extend to land. It remains to be seen whether the chapter has
not thereby come to include details that might be regarded as superfluous,
and to neglect issues that could be vital.

III. The Civilian Population
General Protection against Effects of Hostilities
As related in the previous section, paragraphs 5.3, 11.1 and 11.3 of the
Handbook introduce the civilian population as the "noncombatant persons"
of choice. The phrase "civilian population," as defined in paragraph 11.3,
represents the broad mass of all those who, although themselves in no way
directly involved in the fighting, are likely to be adversely 'affected by it.
These people stand in need of "general protection against the effects of
hostilities," no matter when and where these evil effects occur.
In the traditional dichotomy between the "law of The Hague" and the
"law of Geneva," general protection of the civilian population belongs to
the former. Yet, the treaties adopted by the Hague Peace Conferences of
1899 and 1907 deal with the subject in a rather stepmotherly fashion. They
provide two sets of rules, one of which deals summarily with certain military
operations likely to affect the civilian population (notably, bombardments and
sieges ).13 The other set of rules defines the legal character and effects of
belligerent occupation and goes into the relations between the occupying
power and the authorities and inhabitants of occupied territory.14
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A striking feature of the old rules on sieges and bombardments is their
silence on the plight of the civilians themselves as human beings exposed to
the effects of such warlike activities. This wall of silence surrounding the
civilian population as potential victims of hostilities suffered a first, modest,
breach in 1949 with the adoption of the Fourth Convention Relative to the
"Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War." For present purposes, it
may suffice to refer to Part II, General Protection of Populations Against
Certain Consequences of War, that serves to provide some protection, in
particular, to certain specially vulnerable categories of civilians. The
"consequences" in question may arise as much from the conduct of war on
land as from activities at sea as, for example, naval blockade. 15
While "general protection of the civilian population against the effects of
hostilities" long remained a neglected and, hence, somewhat indeterminate
notion in the past, its contours became more sharply defined after World War
II. The first occasion was the XXth International Conference of the Red
Cross, held in 1965 in Vienna. It adopted a resolution which "solemnly
declares" four "general principles of the Law of War." Of relevance here
are the twin principles "that it is prohibited to launch attacks against the
civilian populations as such," and "that distinction must be made at all times
between persons taking part in the hostilities and members of the civilian
population to the effect that the latter be spared as much as possible. "16
The United Nations General Assembly subsequently affirmed three of the
four principles, including the two principles on protection of the civilian
population, by a unanimously adopted resolution of 19 December 1968.t7 As
this commentator wrote earlier:
Although the General Assembly of the United Nations does not possess any formal
legislative powers in matters of international law, the unanimous reaffirmation of the
principles in question as valid norms of international law can certainly be regarded as
an authoritative statement of the law. From this moment it has become very difficult
for a Member of the United Nations to deny the validity of the principles spelt out
in the Resolution, and of the principle of distinction in particular.l8

As the drafting history of the 1977 Additional Protocols shows, no "Member
of the United Nations" nor, for that matter, any other state has ventured
to deny the validity of the principles. On the contrary, Protocol I enshrines
them. Moreover, the Protocol expands them into a set of detailed rules. 19
The Handbook reiterates the three principles of December 1968 in paragraph
8.1, Principles of Lawful Targeting, of Chapter 8, The Law of Naval
Targeting. In order to examine what it has to say in detail about the protection
of the civilian population, it is necessary to pay somewhat closer attention
to the two principles concerned, beginning with the principle prohibiting
attacks on the civilian population.
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Civilian Population Not the Object of Attack
Clearly, this prohibition is not, on principle, subject to any considerations
of policy, opportunity, or whatever. The only conceivable exception might
perhaps lie in acts of reprisal against the enemy civilian population, a form
of action that customary international law cannot with certainty be stated
to forbid. Protocol I aims to seal this gap by categorically prohibiting reprisals
against civilians, civilian objects in general (Arts. 51, 52) and a long list of
specially protected civilian objects in particular (Arts. 53-56). These
prohibitions are the outcome of difficult negotiations at the Diplomatic
Conference of 1974-1977, and they have since remained the subject of sharp
criticism from some quarters.
None of the states becoming party to Protocol I has made an express
reservation to the provisions at issue. Close to a formal reservation comes
the "understanding" of Italy, to the effect that it shall react to grave and
systematic violations of Arts. 51 and 52 by all permissible means under
international law, with a view to preventing further violations. Fortunately,
this poorly masked threat of reprisal is preceded by a formal acceptance of
the competence of the International Fact-Finding Commission, to be
established in accordance with Art. 90, to "enquire into any facts alleged to
be a grave breach as defined in the Conventions and this Protocol or other
serious violation of the Conventions or of this Protocol."2O
It is a matter of some considerable regret that the Handbook states bluntly,
in subparagraph 6.2.3 (Reprisal) of Section 6.2 (Enforcement of the Law of
Armed Conflict), that "[r]eprisals may be taken against enemy armed forces;
enemy civilians, other than those in occupied territory; and enemy property." It is
not at all certain that this statement is in conformity with customary
international law. While the prohibition of such acts cannot be stated with
certainty either, the most that can be said is that the law is in a state of
indecision. In these circumstances, the blunt affirmation in a brand-new
military manual of a major military power of an unquestioned right of reprisal
against the civilian population represents a most unwelcome contribution to
the "development of international humanitarian law applicable in armed
conflicts. "
An additional point of criticism is that the list in paragraph 6.2 of the
"various means available to belligerents under international law for inducing
the observance oflegitimate warfare" does not include recourse to an outside
fact-finding mechanism. Evidently, as the United States is not presently
becoming a party to Protocol I, it is not in a position to accept the competence ,
of the Art. 90 Commission. Yet, the road to ad hoc neutral enquiry is always
open, and the Handbook should make the point explicit. Instead, it simply lists
as the first available means of law enforcement: "Publicize the facts with
a view toward influencing world public opinion against the offending nation. "
This may be quite a useful means against the offender once the facts have
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been established, but this is precisely where the shoe pinches. Giving publicity
to non-established facts is no more than making allegations.
After this short excursion into the field of reprisals, as a possible exception
to the principle that the civilian population shall not be the object of attack,
we return to the main principle. Application of the principle may in practice
be thwarted by the practical difficulty of determining civilian status. As will
be seen hereafter, Art. 50 (1) of Protocol I prescribes that whenever there
is "doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to
be a civilian. "
While this rule, if faithfully applied, may largely solve the problem with
respect to individuals, another matter altogether is the character of "the
civilian population" as a group of persons. Will, for instance, the inhabitants
of a town or village continue to enjoy immunity from attack when they have
some few soldiers quartered among them? And what of a refugee camp where
a good number of the inhabitants are found to be combatants, fully equipped
as such?
In an attempt to resolve this issue, Art. 50 (3) of Protocol I provides that:
"The presence within the civilian population of individuals who do not come
within the definition of civilians does not deprive the population of its civilian
character." This may be the correct solution when, in such a mixed situation,
civilians constitute the overwhelming majority. But what if the balance
between civilians and combatants is less evidently in their favor? From a
military point of view, the immunity of some few civilians cannot forever
shield an important military objective from attack.
Protocol I tackles this dilemma in more than one way. First, Art. 51 (7)
issues a stern warning against misusing the civilian population to "render
certain points or areas immune from military operations. "21 The point is
reinforced by the obligation of belligerent parties to protect civilians under
their control by taking "precautions against the effects of attacks." Art. 58
(which bears this caption) requires, as self-evident measures, that each party
shall take, "to the maximum extent feasible," the removal of civilians from
the vicinity of military objectives, and, the other way round, military
objectives from civilians.22
Obviously, there can be no firm guarantee that this will be done. What,
therefore, if one side disregards the prohibitions set forth in Art. 51 (7), so
that the other side cannot carry out an attack on a military objective without
at the same time seeming to perpetrate an "attack on the civilian population?"
To this pressing question, Art. 51 (8) gives a rather evasive reply. The crux
of the matter is that "the parties" are reminded of their "obligation to take
the precautionary measures provided for in Article 57."23
Civilian Population to Be Spared As Much As Possible
This brings us to the other fundamental principle at stake,
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obligation of belligerent parties, in carrying out military operations, to spare
the civilian population as much as possible. Art. 57 (1) states the principle:
"In the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare
the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects." Art. 57 (2) to (4)
demonstrates clearly that the protection offered by this principle is, in contrast
with the first principle, essentially relative in nature, as situations may arise
where civilians simply cannot be spared.24
The order of preference in Art. 57 is, however, clear: first, try to avoid
any incidental loss or collateral damage; if this is impossible, then at least
try to minimize it; and in the last resort, refrain from pressing an attack that
would cause excessive, that is, disproportionate damage to the civilian
population.
These are no mean requirements to put to the military. Yet, they do not
appear to be beyond the capacities of a well-trained, well-disciplined armed
force, and they doubtless represent the right attitude of mind for any selfrespecting soldier. They are even entirely commendable from the point of
view of economical use of military means. At the same time, translation of
the juridical phraseology of the Protocol into practical, easily understandable
terms is of course necessary.
The Handbook on General Protection
In the Handbook the detailed rules on protection of the civilian population
are spread over several sections. Confining ourselves for the moment to
Chapter 11, the relevant paragraphs are 11.2 and 11.3. Paragraph 11.2,
Protected Status, purports to deal with general aspects of the protection of
all "noncombatant persons." Whether this is correct for all categories shall
be examined infra. Applied to civilians, the rules it contains fairly accurately
reflect some main aspects of the law as codified in Protocol I. It mentions
the requirement of advance warning, adding that: "Such warnings are not
required, however, if mission accomplishment, including the security of
attacking forces, is premised on the element of surprise." It places on record
the "affirmative duty" of "a party to an armed conflict that has control over
civilians ... to remove them from the vicinity of targets of likely enemy
attack and to otherwise separate military activities and facilities from areas
of[ civilian] concentration." It affirms that: "Deliberate use of[ civilians] to
shield military objectives from enemy attack is prohibited." And it concludes
that: "The presence of[ civilians] within or adjacent to a legitimate target
does not, however, preclude its attack."
Although all this may appear acceptable enough, it is far from giving the
full story. In effect, the opening sentence of paragraph 11.2 sets the wrong
tone, in that it provides:
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The law of armed conflict prohibits making noncombatant persons the object of
intentional attack and requires that they be safeguarded against injury not incidental
to military operations directed against combatant forces and other military objectives.

While this is a correct statement as far as it goes, the-.point is that it does
not go far enough. Lacking is the recognition that civilians must be
"safeguarded," first and foremost, against injury that is "incidental to military
operations directed against combatant forces and other military objectives."
Paragraph 11.2, in short, does not take up, or even refer to, the problem of
incidental loss and collateral damage, let alone recognize proportionality as
the ultimate standard of justifiable injury to civilians.
For this, the reader must look elsewhere in the Handbook, notably in
paragraph 8.1.2.1, Incidental Injury and Collateral Damage, of Chapter 8,
The Law of Naval Targeting. Here, the naval commander is urged to "take
all practicable precautions, taking into account military and humanitarian
considerations, to keep civilian casualties and damage to the absolute
minimum consistent with mission accomplishment and the security of the
force," and he is required to "determine whether incidental injuries and
collateral damage would be excessive, on the basis of an honest and reasonable
estimate of the facts available to him. " The commander is moreover required
to "decide, in light of all the facts known or reasonably available to him,
including the need to conserve resources and complete the mission
successfully, whether to adopt an alternative method of attack, if reasonably
available, to reduce civilian casualties and damage. "
This represents a clear attempt to summarize the law relating to protection
of the civilian population. The text is open to the criticism that it lays too
heavy an accent on "mission accomplishment." This undefined concept, that
has no place in positive international law, may all too easily be misused as
an excuse for otherwise unjustifiable acts of war affecting the civilian
population.
This being said, the inclusion of the paragraph in a part of the law that
came to be clarified only with the adoption of Protocol I, is warmly
welcomed. The same goes for paragraph 8.1.2, Civilian Objects, specifying
certain limitations on the right to attack objects of special importance to the
civilian population. The present commentator merely wishes to add that he
would have preferred to see both paragraphs repeated in Chapter 11; after
all, the distinction between "naval targeting" and "noncombatant persons"
is not rigidly maintained elsewhere either.
Returning once again to Chapter 11, paragraph 11.3 states:
Unlike military personnel ... civilians are immune from attack unless they are acting
in direct support of the enemy's war-fighting or war-sustaining effort. Civilians
providing command, administrative, or logistic support to military operations are subject
to attack while so engaged. Similarly, civilian employees of naval shipyards, merchant
seamen in ships carrying military cargoes, and laborers engaged in the construction of
military fortifications, may be attack [sic] while so employed.
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This statement too, is open to criticism. First, it creates the erroneous
impression that in given situations, civilians may be deliberately chosen as
the target of attack even though they are not taking a direct part in hostilities.
A more accurate statement would be that in such situations, civilians are more
than normally exposed to the risks of war because they happen to be in, on,
under, or near an object that is open to attack as a military objective.25 In
such situations, the applicable principle is that they "must be spared as much
as possible"-not that they provide fair game.
Over and above this fundamental criticism, the above phrases suffer from
an apparent tendency to construe the law-and thereby to influence
practice-in a sense that goes to the detriment of the civilian population. One
can accept use of the phrase, activities "in direct support of the enemy's warfighting effort." To add "war-sustaining effort" is going too far, however,
as this might easily be interpreted to encompass virtually every activity in
the enemy country.

"Civilians" and "Civilian Population"
In the above, the notions of" civilian" and" civilian population" were taken
for granted. Internationally accepted definitions for each of these notions
were introduced in Protocol I. According to Art. 50 (2), "[t]he civilian
population comprises all persons who are civilians." A civilian is, according
to Art. 50 (1), "any person who does not belong to one of the categories of
persons referred to in Article 4 A (1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third Convention
and in Article 43 of this Protocol." This definition-by-reference may be
reduced to the statement that the civilian population comprises all those
persons who are not members of the armed forces. (The latter notion is taken
here in a broad sense, including armed groups such as militias, volunteer corps
and organized resistance movements that, although not forming part of the
regular armed forces, respect certain specificied conditions, with
recognizability as a most essential one among them).26
The second sentence of Art. 50 (1) emphasizes that: "In case of doubt
whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian. "
It is a matter of some regret that this important provision is not reflected
in the Handbook. Not that the rule represents any great innovation in the law
of armed conflict; surely, it could hardly be otherwise. Yet to remind military
commanders of this necessary premise in their contacts with unknown persons
remains extremely useful.
Up to a point, the definition in Art. 50 (2) is accurately reflected in the
text of paragraph 11.3 (as quoted in section II infra). The most obvious
deviation resides in the qualifying phrase "and not otherwise taking a direct
part in hostilities." Paragraph 11.3, 'sub para. 2, is even more explicit:
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Civilians who take a direct part in hostilities by taking up arms or otherwise trying
to kill, injure, or capture enemy persons or destroy enemy property lose their immunity
and may be attacked. Similarly, civilians serving as lookouts, guards, or intelligence
agents for military forces may be attacked.

Similar language is not found in Art. 50. On the other hand, Art. 51 (3)
provides that: "Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section,
unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities."
This sentence differs in more than one respect from the language in
paragraph 11.3 of the Handbook. First, while the latter text carries the
suggestion of a permanent loss of status and protection, Art. 51 (3) makes
abundantly clear that the loss of protection is dependent on, and does not
outlast, the activities at issue. In other words, the law is that a civilian who
participated directly in hostilities but who has terminated his participation,
is once again fully entitled to protection as a civilian and, hence, immune
from attack (although he is liable to be punished for his hostile acts).
To be in accordance with the rule in Protocol I, the loss of immunity in
paragraph 11.3 should not be understood as a permanent loss of status but,
rather, as a temporary suspension of protection. The Handbook could be clearer
on this score.
Another notable aspect is the terms by which paragraph 11.3 sets out to
make the abstract notion of" direct participation in hostilities" more tangible.
That "taking up arms or otherwise trying to kill, injure, or capture enemy
persons" are listed under this heading may seem acceptable enough. Yet, the
"enemy persons" may themselves be engaged in an unlawful act against
civilian life or property, thereby justifying an act in self-defense on the part
of the threatened civilians. Does the Handbook simply assume that U.S. naval
personnel will not engage in such evil ways? A stern warning against any
such conduct justifying forceful counter-measures on the part of the victims
might be in order.
The next specific act mentioned in paragraph 11.3, "trying to destroy
enemy property," is altogether too broad and vague to justify, in all cases,
loss of protection as a civilian. It is just about as easy to think of instances
where this consequence is justified, as of other ones where this is certainly
not the case. The phrase should either be specified or deleted.
Is it correct to assert, as paragraph 11.3 does, that "civilians serving as
lookouts, guards, or intelligence agents for military forces may be attacked"?
This is yet another example of a statement that is simply too sweeping to
guarantee that civilians shall not be attacked without just cause.
The present commentator regrets the apparent tendency in Chapter 11 to
construe "direct participation in hostilities" in such wide terms. It is, of
course, acknowledged that the concept is notoriously difficult to construe,
and that the task of doing so falls to the competent national authorities. As
the late Professor Waldemar A. Solf wrote, "As the interpretation of these
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terms may affect matters of life or death, it is iIideed regrettable that the
ambiguities are left for resolution to the practice of States in future
conflicts. "27
A good starting point for a narrower construction might be in the following
quotation: " 'Direct' participation means acts of war which by their nature
or purpose are likely t'o cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment
of the enemy armed forces."28
Levee en masse
Reference should be made here to the levee en masse as a special case
wa):"ranting attacks on civilians. Ever since the Hague Regulations on land
warfare, 1899, the law has recognized that: "Inhabitants of a nonoccupied
territory, who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to
resist the invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into
regular armed units" are not liable to punishment for their warlike acts and,
when captured, are entitled to prisoner-of-war status, "provided they carry
arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war."29
The difference between participants in a levee en masse and the civilians of
Art. 51 (3) lies not so much in the treatment they will get while engaged
in active hostilities. They are all equally open to attack. However, when they
fall into enemy hands while so engaged, members of the former category are
not liable to be punished for their warlike acts and are entitled to prisonerof-war status, whereas persons of the latter type are not entitled to either
prerogative. Again, when the enemy gets hold of persons of either category
only after they returned to normal "civilian" life, he must leave the
participants in the levee en masse untouched but may still put the other
individuals on trial.
In view of the apparent broad scope of application of the Handbook, and
keeping in mind the possibility of u.S. forces taking part, for example, in
an amphibious operation that the inhabitants of the territory concerned may
be expected to regard as an invasion, the levee en masse should not remain
unnoticed.
Protection under the Fourth Convention
As noted earlier in this chapter, a separate Convention for the protection
of civilians saw the light in 1949. Part II of this Fourth Convention deals,
as its title indicates, with the "general protection of populations against
certain consequences of war." The consequences envisaged here are not,
however, the effects of hostilities on the civilian population in general but,
rather, the risks threatening certain especially vulnerable categories of
civilians, such as wounded, sick and aged persons, children under fifteen,
expectant mothers, and mothers of children under seven. The risks in question
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may arise as much from the conduct of war on land as from activities at sea
as, for example, naval blockade.
In this respect, reference may be made once again to Art. 23.30 This Article
outlaws the infliction of a total blockade in complete disregard of the fate
of the civilian population. In the Handbook, subparagraph 7.7.3, Special Entry
and Exit Authorization, of paragraph 7.7, Blockade, briefly refers to this
matter, stating that "neutral vessels and aircraft engaged in the carriage of
qualifying relief supplies for the civilian population and the sick and wounded
should be authorized to pass through the blockade cordon."
Another fleeting reference to a subject dealt with in Part II of the Fourth
Convention is found in subparagraph 6.2.2, The International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRe). It mentions the task assigned to the ICRC under the
Geneva Conventions, inter alia, of "offering its 'good offices' to facilitate
establishment of hospitals and safety zones." This reflects the possibility,
recognized in Art. 14, for parties to a conflict to establish hospital and safety
zones, so organized as to protect especially vulnerable categories of people
from the effects of war.
Part III of the Fourth Convention, entitled "Status and Treatment of
Protected Persons," provides for the protection of those civilians who are
considered "protected persons" under Art. 4. 31 The protection of this Part
extends to persons who find themselves, for whatever reason, in enemy
territory or in territory under enemy occupation. For either situation, Part
III contains elaborate sets of rules. One section deals at length with the
treatment of internees, laying down rules that closely resemble those
applicable to prisoners of war.
While the Handbook does not pay express attention to belligerent
occupation, Chapter 11 does contain a paragraph 11.9 on Interned Persons.
Rigorously condensing the vast mass of treaty provisions to a few clear lines,
it succeeds remarkably well in bringing out the essence of the "humane
treatment" due such "protected persons."

Civilians Under Special Protection
The law of armed conflict singles out for special protection certain specified
categories of civilians, either because they are regarded as especially
vulnerable or on account of the functions they perform. The Handbook also,
in various chapters, pays occasional attention to the situation of these persons.
As the rules relating to the protection of these diverse categories of civilians
are closely linked to those on the status and protection of members of the
armed forces who qualify for special protection, they are dealt with in the
next section.
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IV. Other "Noncombatant Persons"
Medical Personnel and Chaplains
After the civilian population, paragraph 11.1 lists "medical personnel and
chaplains" as a first category of "members of the armed forces who enjoy
special protected status." Paragraph 11.5 enlarges upon the point: "Medical
and dental officers, technicians and corpsmen, nurses, and medical service
personnel, have special protected status when engaged exclusively in medical
duties and may not be attacked." As regards chaplains, the Section specifies
that in order to "enjoy protected status equivalent to that of medical
personnel," they must be "engaged in ministering to the armed forces. "
While paragraph 11.5 provides an undivided list of the medical personnel
who all qualify for the same protected status, the treaties in force recognize
certain distinctions. For present purposes, importance attaches to the
distinction between permanent and temporary personnel. Art. 24 of the First
Convention defines the position of the permanent military medical staff and
chaplains, as follows:
Medical personnel exclusively engaged in the search for, or the collection, transport
or treatment of the wounded or sick, or in the prevention of disease, staff exclusively
engaged in the administration of medical units and establishments, as well as chaplains
attached to the armed forces, shall be respected and protected in all circumstances.

As regards the situation at sea, Arts. 22 and 36 of the Second Convention
provide similar protection for" the religious, medical and hospital personnel"
of military hospital ships.
The above persons are, so to speak, "noncombatants" by profession. They
are, by virtue of their function, permanently precluded from taking an active
part in hostilities. There can be little doubt that the term "noncombatants"
in Art. 3 of the Hague Regulations ("The armed forces of the belligerent
parties may consist of combatants and noncombatants") refers to the medical
personnel and chaplains of the armed forces in the first place.
Almost but not entirely on a par with these prototypical "noncombatants"
are the temporary paramedical personnel. Art. 25 of the First Convention
provides that:
Members of the armed forces specially trained for employment, should the need arise,
as hospital orderlies, nurses or auxiliary stretcher-bearers, in the search for or the
collection, transport or treatment of the wounded and sick shall likewise be respected
and protected if they are carrying out these duties at the time when they come into
contact with the enemy or fall into his hands.

While a strong preference for non-violent behavior or even a sense of
vocation may have prompted these "members of the armed forces" to apply
for such special training, they enjoy noncombatant status only on a temporary
basis, when they are actually employed in one or other of the above functions.
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At other moments they may be occupied in a normal combatant capacity,
and may then act as such with impunity.
Comparing the above treaty provisions with paragraphs 11.1 and 11.5 of
the Handbook, it appears that the Handbook unacceptably oversimplifies
matters. Mention of the permanent and temporary medical personnel in one
breath leaves the reader with the false impression that like the auxiliary
personnel, members of the permanent medical staff depend for their protected
status on "being engaged exclusively in medical duties," a misunderstanding
that could and should be avoided.
The ground-rule for the treatment of (permanent or temporary) medical
personnel and chaplains is already given in the above treaty texts: they must
be "respected and protected." It follows that they shall not be the object
of attack. An obvious precondition is that they are recognized in their quality
as medical personnel or chaplains. As to this, a surgeon who performs an
operation in a military field hospital without wearing the "armlet bearing
the distinctive emblem" prescribed by Art. 40 of the First Convention, will
not lightly be mistaken for someone who is "taking a direct part in hostilities."
On the other hand, uniformed auxiliary medical personnel searching for
wounded in the field run a serious risk of being mistaken for unprotected
combatants if they fail to wear the "white armlet bearing in its centre the
distinctive sign in miniature" as prescribed in Art. 41 of the First Convention.
Subparagraph 11.10.6 correctly reflects this point.
The Conventions do not state in so many words that permanent military
medical personnel and chaplains, and the temporary personnel while engaged
in a paramedical function, shall themselves refrain from taking an active part
in hostilities. Yet this is an evident condition for effective immunity from
attack. A chaplain who, arms in hand, leads an attack (as seems to have
happened in Viet Nam) cannot (and probably does not) expect to be respected
as a "noncombatant." On the contrary, his active participation in hostilities
constitutes an unlawful act of war and, hence, a war crime.
Medical or paramedical personnel who perpetrate a similar act under the
cover of the red cross or red crescent may, under the terms of Art. 85 (3)
(f) of Protocol I, be guilty of an act of perfidy amounting to a grave breach
of the Protocol. This point is stated in paragraph 12.2 (Misuse of Protective
Signs, Signals and Symbols) of Chapter 12 (Deception During Armed
Conflict) of the Handbook. The paragraph explains that acts of the above type
"undermine the effectiveness of protective signs, signals, and symbols and
thereby jeopardize the safety of noncombatants and the immunity of protected
structures and activities."
Another matter altogether is that medical personnel may be armed and
"use the arms in their own defence, or in that of the wounded and sick in
their charge" (Art. 22, First Conv~ntion). Paragraph 11.5 correctly specifies
that the arms must be "small arms." It adds that the arms may also serve
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"for protection from marauders and others violating the law of armed
conflict." One senses here a typical reflection of the asserted constitutional
right of all Americans to carry a weapon in self-defense. While "protection
from marauders" seems all right, the present commentator has some difficulty
with the added category of "others violating the law of armed conflict." His
fear would be that such a vague phrase might easily lead to confusion.
Upon capture, permanent military medical personnel and chaplains "shall
be retained only in so far as the state of health, the spiritual need and the
number of prisoners of war require;" thus retained, they shall not themselves
be deemed prisoners of war (Art. 28 of the First Convention). Those who
are not retained "shall be returned to the Party to the conflict to whom they
belong, as soon as a road is open for their return and military requirements
permit" (Art. 30). Temporary personnel, on the other hand, "shall be
prisoners of war, but shall be employed on their medical duties in so far as
the need arises" (Art. 29).
As against all this, paragraph 11.5 simply states that: "Medical personnel
and chaplains falling into enemy hands do not become prisoners of war." And
the next sentence draws the equally sweeping conclusion that, "[u]nless their
retention by the enemy is required to provide for the medical or religious
needs of prisoners of war," they all "must be repatriated at the earliest
opportunity. "
Not specifically mentioned in the Handbook, but falling in the same class
and under the same protections as the permanent military medical personnel,
are their civilian colleagues on the staff of duly recognized Red Cross, Red
Crescent or other voluntary aid societies (Art. 26 of the First Convention),
the religious, medical and hospital personnel of other than military hospital
ships (Arts. 24 and 36 of the Second Convention), and, according to Art. 20
of the Fourth Convention "persons regularly and solely engaged in the
operation and administration of civilian hospitals, including the personnel
engaged in the search for, removal and transporting of and caring for wounded
and sick civilians, the infirm and maternity cases." As for the Red Cross and
other civilian personnel, they "may not be detained" and "shall have
permission to return to their country, or if this is not possible, to the territory
of the Party to the conflict in whose service they were, as soon as a route
for their return is open and military considerations permit" (Art. 32 of the
First Convention).
Combatants in Various Situations of Distress
Of a different character altogether aFe the next class of "noncombatant
persons" listed in paragraphs 5.3 and 11.1: members of the armed forces "who
have been rendered incapable of combat by wounds, sickness, shipwreck, or
capture." Such persons differ from medical personnel and chaplains in that
they find themselves in a noncombatant position, not as a matter of vocation,
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profession or preference but by accident, or indeed by a stroke of bad luck.
They are first and foremost combatants and, as such, are not precluded in
principle from taking up arms against the enemy. A wounded soldier is fully
entitled to open fire on an adversary, provided he does not do so while feigning
to be incapacitated by his wounds. Even when taken prisoner, a soldier retains
his capacity and status as a combatant; thus, he may escape with impunity,
and his national legislation may even oblige him to attempt to do this.
Paragraph 11.4, The Wounded and Sick, states the principle that
"[m Jembers of the armed forces incapable of participating in combat due to
injury or illness may not be the subject of attack." Paragraph 11.8, Prisoners
of War , adds the equally important principle that when they are given medical
treatment, "no distinction among them will be based on any grounds other
than medical ones. "
Paragraph 11.6, The Shipwrecked, extends similar protection to all
"[sJhipwrecked persons, whether military or civilian." Persons belonging to
the category of the shipwrecked "include those in peril at sea or in other
waters as a result of either the sinking, grounding, or other damage to a vessel
in which they are embarked, or of the downing or distress of an aircraft. "
Obviously, the above comments about "noncombatants against their will"
do not apply to the civilians among the shipwrecked. That they are placed
on the same footing as the military shipwrecked is easily understood in the
light of the situation at sea, where shipwreck means the same extreme danger
for everyone and where rescue without discrimination has become more or
less the natural thing to do.
Equally self-evident, although phrased in such complicated "legal" terms
as to be open to interpretation in practice, are the exceptions made in the
second subparagraph of paragraph 11.6:
Shipwrecked persons do not include combatant personnel engaged in amphibious,
underwater, or airborne attacks who are proceeding ashore, unless they are clearly in
distress and require assistance. In the latter case they qualify as shipwrecked persons
only if they cease all active combat activity and the enemy has an opportunity to
recognize their condition of distress.

The first sentence of paragraph 11.8, Prisoners of War, contemplates
situations of distress combatants may find themselves in just moments before
they are taken prisoner:
Combatants cease to be subject to attack when they have individually laid down their
arms to surrender, when they are no longer capable of resistance, or when the unit
in which they are serving or embarked has surrendered or been captured.

This language corresponds in the main with the provision in Art. 41 (1)
of Protocol I, that "[aJ person who is recognized or who, in the
circumstances, should be recognized to be hors de combat shall not be made
the object of attack." One missing element is, of course, the affirmative duty
of the adversary to recognize the person in question as being hors de combat.
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For the rest, the specific situations where paragraph 11.8 considers a
combatant to be hors de -combat do not markedly differ from those set forth
in Art. 41 (2) of Protocol 1.32
A situation comparable to that of the combatant hors de combat is dealt with
in paragraph 11.7, Parachutists. It provides in part:
Parachutists descending from disabled aircraft may not be attacked while in the air and,
unless they land in territory controlled by their own forces or engage in combatant
acts while descending, must be provided an opportunity to surrender upon reaching the
ground.

This is a more or less faithful reflection of the rules laid down in Art. 42
(1) and (2) of Protocol 1. The inclusion of this provision in paragraph 11.7
may be taken as a sign that the United States regards the position of these
persons as being governed by customary law. 33
Section 11.7 deviates from the language of Art. 42, notably, in the reference
to the performance of "combatant acts while descending." At the Diplomatic
Conference of 1974-1977, in the course of the debate on the draft Article,
some urged that a clause to that effect be included, whereas others asserted
that it would be an empty phrase as performance of such acts in the course
of a descent by parachute was impossible. In the end, a Philippine amendment
to add "unless he commits a hostile act during such descent" failed to obtain
the required two-thirds majority.34
While Art. 42 (3) provides, by way of exception, that "Airborne troops
are not protected by this Article," paragraph 11.7 also excludes from
protection "special warfare infiltrators and intelligence agents." This sounds
reasonable enough. Yet it may not be easy in practice to ascertain that a person
who is parachuting from an airplane that mayor may not be in distress actually
belongs to one of these sinister categories.
Prisoners of War
As provided in paragraph 11.8, Prisoners of War, "combatants that have
surrendered or otherwise fallen into enemy hands are entitled to prisonerof-war status." Subparagraph 2 defines the persons. entitled in principle to
such status. They "include members of the regular armed forces, the militia
and volunteer units fighting with the regular armed forces, and civilians
accompanying the armed forces." While the Handbook poses no further
conditions for members of the regular armed forces, subparagraph 2 specifies
in a second sentence:
Militia, volunteers, guerrillas, and other partisans not fighting in association with the
regular armed forces qualify for prisoner-of-war status upon capture, provided they
are commanded by a person responsible for their conduct, are uniformed or bear a fixed
distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, carry their arms openly and conduct their
operations in accordance with the law of armed conflict.
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This sentence provides a slightly simplified version of the traditional law,
while at the same time supplementing it with embellishments and explanatory
elements of its own. In doing so, it largely relies on the treaties to which
the United States is a party. For the rest, it appears to borrow elements from
Protocol I or, indeed, from its drafting history.
The applicable pre-Protocol treaty law is found mainly in Art. 13 common
to the First and Second Geneva Conventions and in Art. 4 of the Third
Convention. As far as relevant here, these Articles list in identical terms, first,
the members of regular armed forces, including "members of militias or
volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces," and secondly:
Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of
organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in
or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such
militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfil the
following conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of
war.

Like the quoted phrase in paragraph 11.8, these Articles distinguish between
the regular armed forces and other armed groups, and specify a number of
conditions the latter groups have to meet in order to qualify for prisoner-.
of-war status. The main difference is in the definition of the not-so-regular
armed groups, with the treaty provisions specifically mentioning resistance
movements, as a species of the genus "other volunteer corps." That resistance
movements were mentioned at all was a great victory in 1949, after the failure
of the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 to resolve the problem of
armed resistance in occupied territory in a satisfactory manner.
At the same time, it was but half a victory, because the 1949 text maintained
the four conditions as adopted in 1907 (including the element that the
distinctive sign had to be "fixed"-a rather unfortunate German addition
of that year to the text established in 1899). Even in 1949 it was a well-known
fact that resistance movements are rarely able to meet all four conditions.
It also became clear that even regular armed forces very often rely on cover
and camouflage rather than, as in the days of yore, on the splendor and
brilliance of their uniforms and arms. On the other hand, irregular fighters
were often treated in practice as combatants and prisoners of war, even if
they had not met all four conditions all the time.
These facts eventually led to the adoption of Art. 43 (1) of Protocol I,
providing a completely new definition of" armed forces." The new text does
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away with the distinction between "regular" and "irregular" armed forces,
as also with the list of stringent conditions of 1907. Instead, it requires
organization, responsible command, and discipline. 35 The obligation of
combatants "engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to
an attack" to "distinguish themselves from the civilian population" is laid
down in Art. 44 (3), leaving open how they will discharge this obligation.36
One obvious means remains the uniform. As specified in para. 7, Art. 44 "is
not intended to change" the practice of regular armed forces with respect
to the wearing of the uniform - no matter what that practice may be.
The definition of "armed forces" in Art. 43 (1) doubtless constitutes new
law, and the United States is therefore legally entitled to disregard it. At
the same time, one cannot but feel a sense of regret at this posture, which
contradicts not only the stand taken by its delegation at the Diplomatic
Conference of 1974-1977 but, perhaps even more strikingly, its own practice
in the Vietnam War, a practice that served as an example to the rest of the
world and was a source of inspiration for the negotiators at the Conference.
In particular, after all that has happened, it is difficult to accept as serious
propositions that a distinction should still be maintained between regular and
other armed forces and that the latter would be required at all times to "be
uniformed or bear a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance" and
"carry their arms openly."
Given the rather retrograde posture of the Handbook on the matter of
qualification as prisoners of war, the reference in paragraph 11.8 to
"guerrillas" and "partisans" is all the more surprising. Such catchwords may
have been used in the debate preceding the adoption of Art. 43 (1) of Protocol
I, but they were no more included in the text than other comparable, equally
undefined terms, if only because they are as open to subjective interpretation
as, for example, the word "terrorist. "37
The third and last subparagraph of paragraph 11.8 provides, in accordance
with the rule in Art. 5 of the Fourth Convention, that in case of doubt, a
captive is entitled to "prisoner-of-war treatment until a competent tribunal
convened by the captor determines the status to which that individual is
properly entitled."
While the "competent tribunal" is expected to determine a person's
entitlement to prisoner-of-war status, it will usually have to do so on the
basis of a finding concerning that person's combatant status. In this respect,
subparagraph 12.7.1, Illegal Combatants, is of interest. It provides that
"Persons who take part in combat operations without distinguishing
themselves clearly from the civilian population during battle are illegal
combatants and are subject to punishment upon capture." Then, referring
to the above rule on determination of status, it asserts that if a competent
tribunal finds them to be "illegal combatants," they "may be denied prisonerof-war status and be tried and punished for falsely claiming noncombatant
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status during combat." This is followed by the somewhat reassuring
conclusion that: "It is the policy of the United States, however, to accord
illegal combatants prisoner-of-war status if they were carrying their arms
openly at the time of capture. "
All of this can hardly go without a few words in comment. While the
closing part of the first sentence is doubtless correct, the assertion that such
persons are "illegal combatants" is, to say the least, highly controversial. As
the modern law stands, a person either is a member of the armed forces and,
hence, a "combatant," or he does not belong to an armed force and, hence,
is a "civilian." For this, it is immaterial whether the person in question, while
engaged in combat activities, has distinguished himself from the civilian
population. If he failed to do so, he is liable to be punished. In other words,
the better view is that a category of "illegal combatants" simply does not
exist.
As regards the general rule of distinction, the "new law" of Art. 44 (3)
and (4) of Protocol I admits one exception. It concerns the armed combatant
who finds himselfin a situation where, "owing to the nature of the hostilities"
he cannot properly distinguish himself from the civilian population while
"engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack."
If this man then fails to meet even the minimum requirement of carrying
his arms openly, (a) during a military engagement and (b) "during such time
as he is visible to the adversary while he is engaged in a military deployment
preceding the launching of an attack in which he is to participate," he forfeits
"his right to be a prisoner of war, but he shall, nevertheless, be given
protections equivalent in all respects to those accorded to prisoners of war
by the Third Convention and by this Protocol."
This exception to the principle of distinction is among the points most
strongly objected to by the United States.38 To some extent, the quoted phrases
of subparagraph 12.7.1 reflect these objections, in that they disqualify as
"illegal combatants" all those who take part in combat operations without
proper distinction. At the same time, one senses a reluctant (or audacious?)
attempt to meet the "new law" half-way in the closing sentence, where it
is declared to be U.S. policy to accord prisoner-of-war status (not merely
treatment) even to persons who have been found to be "illegal combatants"
- this on the condition that they were carrying arms openly at the time of
capture, rather than during the periods of activity and visibility indicated
above. This is surprising, because the moment of capture may occur days after
the aforesaid combat activities. Perhaps the sentence is intended to mean
exactly the same as the rule in Art. 44 (4), the assumption being that capture
will take place in the course of the combat activities.
As for the treatment of prisoners of war, it may suffice to note that while
this is dealt with in minute detail in the Fourth Convention, the Handbook
obviously does not repeat all of this. Paragraph 11.8 states the principle that
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they "must be treated humanely and protected against violence, intimidation,
insult, and public curiosity," as well as the main rules on interrogation,
including the prohibition of "[ t ]orture, threats, or other coercive acts." After
. rracts ab out "tria
. 1 and PUOlS
. hment, ""1 ab or, " and" escape "
some b aSlC
(subparagraphs 11.8.1 to 11.8.3), subparagraph 11.8.4 lays down some sensible
rules for the "Temporary Detention of Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees,
and Other Detained Persons Aboard Naval Vessels." None of this needs
special comment.
War Correspondents and Other Persons Accompanying the Armed Forces
While section III of this essay dealt with civilians as members of very broad
categories (the entire civilian population, or large segments, such as
inhabitants of occupied territory), a totally different approach consists in
singling out specified classes of civilians for special protection. A case in point
is the war cO"rrespondent, mentioned in paragraph 5.3 of the Handbook. He
belongs, in the terms of Art. 4 A (4) of the Third Convention, to the "[p]ersons
who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof."
As distinct from the information officer (who is a member of the armed
forces), the war correspondent, although officially accredited with the armed
forces, is a civilian and must in principle be treated as such. Yet his work
exposes him to the risk of falling into enemy hands.
Accordingly, it was provided in Art. 13 of the Hague Regulations that in
case this happened and if the enemy considered it "expedient to detain" war
correspondents they were then "entitled to be treated as prisoners of war,
provided they [were] in possession of a certificate from the military
authorities of the army which they were accompanying." Art. 81 of the 1929
Prisoners-of-War Convention used more or less the same language. The most
important innovation was that the requirement of a certificate had been
replaced by a requirement of authorization from the same military authorities.
Art. 4 A (4) of the present Third Convention differs from the 1929 text in
this one respect that the text no longer refers to the expediency of detaining
the persons in question. This does not, however, materi:dly affect the
situation; they are and remain civilians and the enemy will still be fully entitled
to let them go if he so prefers.
The rule of Art. 4 A (4) applies not only to war correspondents but likewise
to all "[p ]ersons who accompany the armed forces without actually being
members thereof." The Article gives as further examples: "civilian members
of military aircraft crews, ... supply contractors, members of labour units
or of services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces." As with the
war correspondents, a condition for prisoner-of-war status of all these groups
is "that they have received authorization from the armed forces which they
accompany, who shall provide them for that purpose with an identity card
similar to the annexed model." And once again, they all are and remain
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civilians, even though the enemy might think fit to detain them temporarily
or, ifhe so prefers, for the duration of the armed conflict.
In the Handbook, the second subparagraph of paragraph 11.8 refers in passing
to the general category of" civilians accompanying the armed forces."
Journalists on Dangerous Missions
In recent years, a great deal of attention has been given to the risks run
by journalists who report on an ongoing armed conflict without being
accredited as war correspondents with the armed for:ces of one of the parties.
The result is Art. 79 of Protocol I, on "measures of protection for journalists."
The Article aims to provide a modicum of protection to journalists who are
"engaged in dangerous professional missions in areas of armed conflict."
Obviously, such journalists often put their lives at risk in their news-gathering
activities. So long as they roam freely through an area of actual combat, the
law can do little more than remind the belligerent Parties, as Art. 79 does,
that they are civilians and thus are entitled to "general protection" (the
Article states erroneously that they "shall be considered as" civilians).39
While, as explained above, the officially accredited war correspondent who
is captured and detained by the enemy is entitled to treatment as a prisoner
of war despite his status as a civilian, this rule does not apply to other
journalists. Art. 79 of Protocol I does not modify the situation; it merely makes
clear that even in this eventuality, the "journalist engaged in a dangerous
professional mission in an area of armed conflict" is and should be treated
as a civilian.
The "journalists on dangerous missions" have not found a place in the

Handbook.
Crew Members of Merchant Marine and Civil Aircraft
By virtue of Art. 4 A (5) of the Third Convention, and for similar reasons
as war correspondents, the "[m Jembers of crews, including masters, pilots
and apprentices, of the merchant marine and the crews of civil aircraft"
qualify as prisoners of war when detained by the enemy. This rule, although
not mentioned in Chapter 11, is duly reflected in Chapter 8, Naval Targeting,
notably in subparagraph 8.2.2.1.
Protective Signs and Symbols and Other Means of Identification
Paragraph 11.10, Protective Signs and Symbols, sums up the main rules on
use of protective means of identification. With respect to the use Israel makes
of the Red Star of David, instead of the red cross or red crescent as the two
internationally accepted and commonly used symbols, subparagraph 11.10.1
states that the United States "has not agreed that it is a protective symbol."
While this is indubitably correct, perhaps even more important is that the
other 160-odd states of the world equally, and quite emphatically, refuse to
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include it amongst the recognized protective symbols. A U.S. agreement to
recognize the Red Star of David as such could not alter this fact and, with
that, the state of the law.
The paragraph provides a remarkably complete list of protective symbols.
It includes, "for informational purposes only," two symbols established by
Protocol I: one for the protection of dams, dikes and nuclear power plants,
and the other protecting civil defense facilities and personnel. Curiously, it
also mentions, as "of special interest to naval officers," the sign established
by Hague Convention IX of 1907 and, according to the letter of Art. 5,
designed to be used by the inhabitants of towns, etc. open to naval
bombardment, to "indicate" "sacred edifices, buildings used for artistic,
scientific or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places
where the sick or wounded are collected." The "visible signs" prescribed
in Art. 5 and consisting of "large, stiff rectangular panels divided into two
colored triangular portions, the upper portion black, the lower portion
white," can hardly be regarded as well-known. They may even be said to
have fallen into desuetude. 40
In striking contrast to express reference to these obsolete signs is the total
silence on the rules concerning the distinctive marking of hospital ships. In
effect, the only reference to these ships is in paragraph 8.2.3, where they are
listed among the "enemy vessels and aircraft exempt from capture or
destruction." This is all the more astounding as hospital ships are a common
feature of naval warfare and as, both during and after the Diplomatic
Conference of 1974-1977, much has been said and done about the improved
identification of such vessels, also by other than visual means.

v.

Conclusions

A good part of the commentary in the preceding sections deals with civilians
and the civilian population, notably on land. This is a consequence not of
a predilection on the part of the present commentator but, rather, of the
organization and contents of Chapter 11, that puts these people in a frontline
position - in more than one respect. It should be stated straightaway that,
even though much of a commendable nature was found in the relevant parts
of Chapter 11, its overall impression as regards the protection of the civilian
population was not entirely satisfactory.
The most important point is perhaps a question of "turn of mind." Civilians
are not just "noncombatant persons;" they constitute a human society and,
in the event of an international armed conflict, the enemy society. It is first
and foremost in their societal existence that they must be respected and
protected. It is a trite observation that in the practice of contemporary armed
conflicts, members of the civilian population are far more likely to fall victim
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to unjustifiable acts of war than to justifiable ones. Military manuals should
serve to curb this tendency rather than encourage it.
More specifically, the present commentator ventures to suggest that the
paragraphs dealing with the distinction between civilians and combatants and
the fate of civilians taking a direct part in hostilities be rephrased and brought
more in line with the humanitarian spirit of the modern law of war. The
principle that the civilian population be spared as much as possible, now
hidden in a corner of Chapter 8, should be given a more prominent place,
preferably in Chapter 11.
Always in the context of protection of the civilian population, the express
claim of a right of reprisal is "deeply regretted.
It was stated at the outset of section II of this essay that the term
"noncombatant" as used in the Handbook does not represent a simple notion
at all. The discussion in sections III and IV may have made clear that the
phrase is not just deceptively simple; it can hardly be regarded as adequate
to cover the great variety of persons who at a given moment, and for one
reason or another, are not actively engaged in the conduct of military
operations. They range from the "innocent civilian" whose only hope is to
remain unaffected by the hostilities, through the journalist who out of
professional curiosity seeks out the danger areas, the military doctor who by
profession and probably out of idealism will often have to confront the same
types of danger, the wounded soldier who for the time being is incapacitated
by his wounds, to the fighter pilot who has abandoned his disabled aircraft
and parachutes to his own territory where he may hope soon to resume his
combatant handiwork.
This being the case, the question arises whether the treatment of all these
widely different categories of persons in one chapter is really justified. The
present commentator entertains serious doubts in this respect.
Perhaps the point where these doubts become most poignant is with regard
to paragraph 11.2, purporting to lay down a series of general principles
applicable to all "noncombatant persons" without exception. Without going
once again into the details of law relating to specified categories of persons,
it may simply be stated here that unmodified application of the generalities
of paragraph 11.2 to all of these categories may result in serious encroachments
of the law.
There remains the question of the scope of Chapter 11, and of Part II of
the Handbook in general. As set forth in the second section of the present
comments, Part II is apparently designed for global application, on land, at
sea, and in the air. This raises the tremendous difficulty of condensing into
fairly brief paragraphs a great mass oflegal provisions of varying age. While
one may admire in principle the manner in which the authors of the Handbook
have performed this task, some surprising features remain to be noted.
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To this commentator, the most surprising aspect is the scant attention given
in Part II to hospital ships. In our day and age, one would hardly expect an
express reference to Art. 28 of the Second Convention, providing that
"[ s]hould fighting occur on board a warship, the sick-bays shall be respected
and spared as far as possible." In contrast, the hospital ship is an extremely
useful and important element in present-day naval operations, and it deserved
a more prominent place in the Handbook.
In more general terms, a somewhat more extensive treatment of the rules
relating to the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked would appear no exaggerated
luxury in a "Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations." As
the text stands, and with all due respect for the remarkable achievement it
represents, it suffers from a certain imbalance between the commendable
attention given to civilians and other "noncombatant persons" on land, and
a decidedly less extensive and intensive attention to specific problems of
. 0 f" noncombatant persons " at sea.
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